4. The Anglo-US model is characteri

4. The Anglo-US model is characterized by share ownership of individual, and increasingly institutional, investors not affiliated with the corporation known as outside shareholders or “outsiders”; a well-developed legal framework defining the rights and responsibilities of three key players, namely: management, directors and shareholders; and a comparatively uncomplicated procedure for interaction between shareholder and corporation as well as among shareholders.
5. KEY PLAYERS “Corporate Governance Triangle”
6. Share Ownership Pattern • In 1990, institutional investors held approximately 61 percent of the shares of UK corporations, and individuals held approximately 21 percent. (In 1981, individuals held 38 percent.) In 1990, institutions held 53.3 percent of the shares of US corporations.
7. Composition of the Board of Directors Insiders (executive director) Outsiders (non-executive director or independent director) Is a person who is either employed by the corporation who has significant business relationship with corporate management. Is a person/institution which has no direct relationship with the corporation or management
8.  Concentration of power in the hands of one person  Concentration of power in a small group of persons  Management and/or the board of directors’ attempts to retain power over long period of time  The board of directors’ flagrant disregard for the interests of outside shareholders The same person has served as both chairman of the BOD and CEO which led to ff. abuses:
9. Several factors contributed to an increased interest in corporate governance in the UK and US. These included: • increase in institutional investment in both countries; • greater governmental regulation in the US, including regulation requiring some institutional investors to vote at AGMs; • the takeover activity of the mid- to late-1980s; • excessive executive compensation at many US companies and a growing sense of loss of competitiveness vis-а-vis German and Japanese competitors.
10. • the pattern of stock ownership, specifically the above-mentioned increase in institutional investment the growing importance of institutional investors and their voting behavior at AGMs; • recommendations of self-regulatory organizations such as the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in the UK and shareholder organizations in the US. Several factors influenced towards an increasing percentage of OUTSIDERS:
11. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK Laws regulating pension funds also have an important impact on Corporate Governance.In 1988, the agency of the U.S. Department of Labor ruled that: Pension Fund have a "fiduciary responsibility" to exercise their stock ownership right -huge impact on behavior of Private Pension Funds and other institutional investors;Institutional investors have taken a keen interest in all aspects of corporate governance, shareholder's right and voting at annual general meetings U.S. has the most comprehensive disclosure requirements and a complex, well-regulated system for shareholder communication The regulatory framework of UK in corporate governance is established in parliamentary acts and rules established by self-regulatory organizations such as Securities and Investment Board which is responsible for oversight of securities market, this is not a government agency like the SEC in US.
12. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 1. Corporate Financial Data(quarterly basis in the U.S) 2. Breakdown of Corporation's Capital Structure 3. Substantial background information on each nominee to the board of directors(including name, occupation relationship with the company and ownership of stock in the corporation) 4. The aggregate compensation paid to all executive officers(upper mgmt.) as wel as individual compensation data for each of the five highest paid executive officers, who are to be named; 5. All shareholders holding more than 5% of the corporation's total share capital 6. Information on proposed mergers and restructuring 7. Proposed amendments to the articles of association 8. And the names of individuals and/or companies proposed as auditors. Disclosure requirements in the UK and other countries that follow the Anglo-US model ae similar. However, they generally require semi-annual reporting and less data in most categories, including financial statistics and the information provided on nominees.
13. CORPORATE ACTIONS REQUIRING SHAREHOLDERS APPROVAL The 2 routine corporate actions requiring shareholders approval under the Anglo-uS model are: 1. Election of Directors 2. Appointment of Auditors Non-routine corporate actions which also require shareholder approval include: 1. Establishment or amendment of stock option plac(because these plans affect executive and board compensation) 2. mergers and takeovers 3. Restructuring 4. Amendments of the articles of incorporation
14. INTERACTION AMONG PLAYERS • The Anglo-US model establishes a complex, well-regulated system for communication and interaction between shareholders and corporations. A wide range of regulatory and independent organizations play an important role in corporate governance. • Shareholders may exercise their voting right without attending the annual general meeting in person • All registered shareholders received the following by mail(the agenda for the meeting including background information on all proposals"proxy statements", the corporation's annual report and a voting card. • Shareholders may vote by proxy
15. In the Anglo-US model, a wide range of institutional investors and financial specialists monitor a corporation's performance and corporate governance. These include: 1. A variety of specialized investment funds 2. Venture-capital funds, or funds that invest in new or start-up corporation 3. Rating Agencies 4. Auditors 5. Funds that target investment in bankrupt or problem corporation. In contrast, One bank serves many of these functions in the Japanese and German models. As a result, one important element of both of these models is the strong relationship between a corporation and its main bank.
16. JAPANESE MODEL The Japanese model is characterized by a high level of stock ownership by affiliated banks and companies ● a banking system characterized by strong, long-term links between banks and corporation ● A legal, public policy and industrial policy framework designed to support and promote "keiretsu" ● BOD composed of solely insiders and comparatively low(in some corp., non- existent)level of input of outside shareholders ● Equity Financing is important for Japanese Corporations ● Insiders and their affiliates are the major shareholders in most Japanese corporations.
17. KEY PLAYERS The Japanese system of Corporate Governance is many-sided, centering around a main bank and a financial/industrial network or keiretsu ● The bank provides its corporate clients with loans as well as services related to bond issues, equity issues, settlement accounts and related consulting services. ● The main bank is generally a major shareholder in the corporation. ● In the US, Anti-monopoly prohibits one bank from providing this multiplicity of services ● Many Japanese corporation also have a strong financial relationships with a network of affiliated companies. These networks, characterized by crossholding of a debt and equity, trading of goods and services, and informal business contacts, are known as Keiretsu ● Government-directed industrial policy plays a key role in Japanese Governance, this includes official and unofficial representation on corporate boards, when a corporation faces financial difficulty
18. In the Japanese model, the four key players are: 1. Main Bank(a major inside shareholder) 2. Affiliated company or keiretsu(a major inside shareholder) 3. Management and the 4. Government Interaction among these players serves to link relationship rather balance power, as in the case of Anglo-US Model - non-affiliated shareholders have little or no voice in japanese Governance -As a result, there are few truly independent directors(representing outside shareholders)
19. Share Ownership Pattern In Japan, Financial institutions and corporations firmly hold ownership of the equity market. Insurance companies Banks 43 % Corporations 25 % Foreign 3 %
20. Composition of the board of directors Executive managers – the heads of major divisions of the company and its central administrative body. COMMON PRACTICE: • If a company’s profit fall over an extended period, the main bank and member of the keiretsu may remove directors and appoint their own candidates to the company’s board. • Appointment of retiring government bureaucrats to corporate boards • The average japanese board contains 50 members
21. Austrian Corporations governs Some elements also apply Netherlands German Corporations ScandinaviaFrance Belgium
22. UNIQUE ELEMENTS of the GERMAN MODEL Two-tiered Board Structure Which means it consist of a management board and supervisory board. The 2 boards are completely distinct; no one may serve simultaneously on a corporations management board. Size of supervisory board It is set by law cannot be change by shareholders Voting right restrictions Voting right restrictions are legal; these limit a shareholder to voting a certain percentage of the corporation’s total share capital, regardless of share ownership position
23. BOARD COMPOSITIONS Two-tiered Board Management Board “VORSTAND” Supervisory Board “Aufsichtsrat” Employees/labour Union & Shareholders Responsible for daily management of the company Responsible for appointing the management board Responsible for appointing members to the supervisory board
24. KEY PLAYERS BANKS Corporate shareholders Banks usually play a multi- role as shareholder, lender, issuer of both equity and debt, depository. German and Austrian corporations use the abbreviations AG following their names
25. Share Ownership Pattern Corporations Banks 41% 27% Pension Funds Indiv

Results (Indonesian) 1:

4. model Anglo-Amerika ini ditandai dengan kepemilikan saham masing-masing, dan semakin kelembagaan, investor tidak berafiliasi dengan perusahaan yang dikenal sebagai di luar pemegang saham atau "luar"; kerangka hukum berkembang dengan baik yang mendefinisikan hak dan tanggung jawab dari tiga pemain utama, yaitu: manajemen, Direktur dan pemegang saham; dan prosedur yang relatif sederhana untuk interaksi antara pemegang saham dan perusahaan serta antara pemegang saham.5. kunci pemain "Kelola segitiga"6. saling berbagi kepemilikan pola • pada tahun 1990, investor institusi diadakan sekitar 61 persen saham perusahaan UK, dan individu diadakan kira-kira 21 persen. (Pada tahun 1981, individu diadakan 38 persen.) Pada tahun 1990, lembaga diadakan 53,3 persen saham perusahaan-perusahaan AS.7. komposisi Dewan Direksi Insiders (Direktur Eksekutif) luar (Direktur non-eksekutif atau Direktur independen) adalah orang yang baik dipekerjakan oleh perusahaan yang memiliki hubungan bisnis yang signifikan dengan manajemen perusahaan. Adalah orang/lembaga yang tidak memiliki hubungan langsung dengan perusahaan atau manajemen8.  konsentrasi kekuasaan di tangan satu orang  konsentrasi kekuasaan di sekelompok kecil orang  manajemen atau Dewan Direksi upaya untuk mempertahankan kekuasaan selama jangka panjang waktu  Dewan Direksi menyolok mengabaikan kepentingan pemegang luar orang yang sama telah menjabat sebagai kedua Ketua Direksi dan CEO yang menyebabkan pelanggaran ff. :9. Several factors contributed to an increased interest in corporate governance in the UK and US. These included: • increase in institutional investment in both countries; • greater governmental regulation in the US, including regulation requiring some institutional investors to vote at AGMs; • the takeover activity of the mid- to late-1980s; • excessive executive compensation at many US companies and a growing sense of loss of competitiveness vis-а-vis German and Japanese competitors.10. • the pattern of stock ownership, specifically the above-mentioned increase in institutional investment the growing importance of institutional investors and their voting behavior at AGMs; • recommendations of self-regulatory organizations such as the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in the UK and shareholder organizations in the US. Several factors influenced towards an increasing percentage of OUTSIDERS:11. Peraturan kerangka hukum yang mengatur dana pensiun juga memiliki dampak penting pada perusahaan Governance.In 1988, badan dari Departemen Tenaga Kerja Amerika Serikat menyatakan bahwa: dana pensiun memiliki "tanggung jawab fidusia" untuk latihan mereka kepemilikan saham benar - besar dampak pada perilaku pribadi dana pensiun dan investor institusional; investor institusi telah mengambil minat dalam semua aspek tata kelola perusahaan , hak dan pemungutan suara di US Rapat Umum Tahunan pemegang saham memiliki persyaratan pengungkapan informasi yang paling komprehensif dan sistem yang kompleks, diatur dengan baik untuk pemegang saham komunikasi kerangka hukum Inggris dalam tata kelola perusahaan didirikan di Parlemen tindakan dan aturan yang ditetapkan oleh organisasi regulator mandiri seperti efek dan penanaman yang bertanggung jawab untuk pengawasan pasar sekuritas, ini adalah tidak sebuah badan pemerintah seperti SEC di Amerika Serikat.12. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 1. Corporate Financial Data(quarterly basis in the U.S) 2. Breakdown of Corporation's Capital Structure 3. Substantial background information on each nominee to the board of directors(including name, occupation relationship with the company and ownership of stock in the corporation) 4. The aggregate compensation paid to all executive officers(upper mgmt.) as wel as individual compensation data for each of the five highest paid executive officers, who are to be named; 5. All shareholders holding more than 5% of the corporation's total share capital 6. Information on proposed mergers and restructuring 7. Proposed amendments to the articles of association 8. And the names of individuals and/or companies proposed as auditors. Disclosure requirements in the UK and other countries that follow the Anglo-US model ae similar. However, they generally require semi-annual reporting and less data in most categories, including financial statistics and the information provided on nominees.13. CORPORATE ACTIONS REQUIRING SHAREHOLDERS APPROVAL The 2 routine corporate actions requiring shareholders approval under the Anglo-uS model are: 1. Election of Directors 2. Appointment of Auditors Non-routine corporate actions which also require shareholder approval include: 1. Establishment or amendment of stock option plac(because these plans affect executive and board compensation) 2. mergers and takeovers 3. Restructuring 4. Amendments of the articles of incorporation14. interaksi antara pemain • Anglo-AS model menetapkan sistem yang kompleks, diatur dengan baik untuk komunikasi dan interaksi antara pemegang saham dan perusahaan. Berbagai macam peraturan dan independen organisasi memainkan peran penting dalam tata kelola perusahaan. • Pemegang saham dapat melaksanakan suara mereka tepat tanpa menghadiri Rapat Umum tahunan di • orang semua pemegang saham yang terdaftar menerima berikut melalui surat (agenda untuk pertemuan termasuk latar belakang informasi pada semua proposal "pernyataan proxy", laporan tahunan perusahaan dan pemungutan suara card. • pemegang saham dapat memilih oleh proxy15. pada model Anglo-Amerika, berbagai investor institusi dan ahli keuangan memantau kinerja corporation dan tata kelola perusahaan. Ini termasuk: 1. berbagai khusus investasi dana 2. Dana modal ventura, atau dana yang berinvestasi di baru atau start-up perusahaan 3. Lembaga pemeringkat 4. Auditor 5. Dana bahwa target investasi di perusahaan bangkrut atau masalah. Sebaliknya, salah satu bank melayani banyak fungsi ini dalam model Jepang dan Jerman. Sebagai akibatnya, salah satu unsur penting dari kedua model ini adalah hubungan kuat antara corporation dan bank utama.16. JAPANESE MODEL The Japanese model is characterized by a high level of stock ownership by affiliated banks and companies ● a banking system characterized by strong, long-term links between banks and corporation ● A legal, public policy and industrial policy framework designed to support and promote "keiretsu" ● BOD composed of solely insiders and comparatively low(in some corp., non- existent)level of input of outside shareholders ● Equity Financing is important for Japanese Corporations ● Insiders and their affiliates are the major shareholders in most Japanese corporations.17. KEY PLAYERS The Japanese system of Corporate Governance is many-sided, centering around a main bank and a financial/industrial network or keiretsu ● The bank provides its corporate clients with loans as well as services related to bond issues, equity issues, settlement accounts and related consulting services. ● The main bank is generally a major shareholder in the corporation. ● In the US, Anti-monopoly prohibits one bank from providing this multiplicity of services ● Many Japanese corporation also have a strong financial relationships with a network of affiliated companies. These networks, characterized by crossholding of a debt and equity, trading of goods and services, and informal business contacts, are known as Keiretsu ● Government-directed industrial policy plays a key role in Japanese Governance, this includes official and unofficial representation on corporate boards, when a corporation faces financial difficulty18. In the Japanese model, the four key players are: 1. Main Bank(a major inside shareholder) 2. Affiliated company or keiretsu(a major inside shareholder) 3. Management and the 4. Government Interaction among these players serves to link relationship rather balance power, as in the case of Anglo-US Model - non-affiliated shareholders have little or no voice in japanese Governance -As a result, there are few truly independent directors(representing outside shareholders)19. Share Ownership Pattern In Japan, Financial institutions and corporations firmly hold ownership of the equity market. Insurance companies Banks 43 % Corporations 25 % Foreign 3 %20. Composition of the board of directors Executive managers – the heads of major divisions of the company and its central administrative body. COMMON PRACTICE: • If a company’s profit fall over an extended period, the main bank and member of the keiretsu may remove directors and appoint their own candidates to the company’s board. • Appointment of retiring government bureaucrats to corporate boards • The average japanese board contains 50 members21. Austrian Corporations governs Some elements also apply Netherlands German Corporations ScandinaviaFrance Belgium22. UNIQUE ELEMENTS of the GERMAN MODEL Two-tiered Board Structure Which means it consist of a management board and supervisory board. The 2 boards are completely distinct; no one may serve simultaneously on a corporations management board. Size of supervisory board It is set by law cannot be change by shareholders Voting right restrictions Voting right restrictions are legal; these limit a shareholder to voting a certain percentage of the corporation’s total share capital, regardless of share ownership position23. BOARD COMPOSITIONS Two-tiered Board Management Board “VORSTAND” Supervisory Board “Aufsichtsrat” Employees/labour Union & Shareholders Responsible for daily management of the company Responsible for appointing the management board Responsible for appointing members to the supervisory board24. KEY PLAYERS BANKS Corporate shareholders Banks usually play a multi- role as shareholder, lender, issuer of both equity and debt, depository. German and Austrian corporations use the abbreviations AG following their names25. Share Ownership Pattern Corporations Banks 41% 27% Pension Funds Indiv

Results (Indonesian) 2:

4. Model Anglo-US ditandai dengan kepemilikan saham masing-masing, dan semakin kelembagaan, investor tidak berafiliasi dengan perusahaan yang dikenal sebagai pemegang saham luar atau "orang luar"; kerangka hukum yang berkembang dengan mendefinisikan hak dan tanggung jawab dari tiga pemain kunci, yaitu: manajemen, direksi dan pemegang saham; dan prosedur yang relatif sederhana untuk interaksi antara pemegang saham dan perusahaan serta antara pemegang saham.
5. PEMAIN KUNCI "Corporate Governance Triangle"
6. Kepemilikan Saham Pola • Pada tahun 1990, investor institusi diadakan sekitar 61 persen saham dari perusahaan Inggris, dan individu diadakan sekitar 21 persen. (Pada tahun 1981, individu yang diselenggarakan 38 persen.) Pada tahun 1990, lembaga diselenggarakan 53,3 persen saham dari perusahaan-perusahaan AS.
7. Susunan Dewan Direksi Insiders (direktur eksekutif) Outsiders (direktur non-eksekutif atau direktur independen) adalah orang yang baik dipekerjakan oleh perusahaan yang memiliki hubungan bisnis yang signifikan dengan manajemen perusahaan. Adalah orang / lembaga yang tidak memiliki hubungan langsung dengan perusahaan atau manajemen
8.  Konsentrasi kekuasaan di tangan satu orang  Konsentrasi kekuasaan dalam kelompok kecil orang q Manajemen dan / atau dewan direksi 'upaya untuk mempertahankan kekuasaan selama periode waktu yang panjang  Dewan direksi' mencolok mengabaikan kepentingan pemegang saham luar Orang yang sama menjabat sebagai kedua ketua Direksi dan CEO yang menyebabkan ff. pelanggaran:
9. Beberapa faktor berkontribusi meningkatnya minat dalam tata kelola perusahaan di Inggris dan Amerika Serikat. Ini termasuk: • peningkatan investasi kelembagaan di kedua negara; • peraturan pemerintah yang lebih besar di AS, termasuk peraturan yang mengharuskan beberapa investor institusi untuk memilih di RUPS; • aktivitas pengambilalihan pertengahan sampai akhir 1980-an; • kompensasi eksekutif yang berlebihan di banyak perusahaan-perusahaan AS dan tumbuh rasa kehilangan daya saing vis-а-vis Jerman dan pesaing Jepang.
10. • pola kepemilikan saham, khususnya peningkatan tersebut di atas dalam investasi institusional semakin pentingnya investor institusi dan perilaku pilihnya di RUPS; • rekomendasi dari organisasi self regulatory seperti Komite Aspek Keuangan Corporate Governance di Inggris dan organisasi pemegang saham di AS. Beberapa faktor yang mempengaruhi terhadap persentase peningkatan LUAR:
11. Hukum KERANGKA PERATURAN mengatur dana pensiun juga memiliki dampak penting pada Governance.In Perusahaan tahun 1988, lembaga dari Departemen Tenaga Kerja AS memutuskan bahwa: Dana Pensiun memiliki "tanggung jawab fidusia" untuk latihan kepemilikan saham mereka tepat -huge berdampak pada perilaku Swasta Dana pensiun dan investor institusi lainnya; investor institusional telah mengambil minat dalam semua aspek tata kelola perusahaan, hak pemegang saham dan voting pada pertemuan umum tahunan AS memiliki persyaratan pengungkapan yang paling komprehensif dan kompleks, sistem yang diatur untuk komunikasi pemegang saham Kerangka peraturan dari Inggris dalam tata kelola perusahaan yang didirikan pada tindakan parlemen dan aturan yang ditetapkan oleh organisasi swa-regulasi seperti Securities and Investment Badan yang bertanggung jawab untuk pengawasan pasar surat berharga, ini bukan lembaga pemerintah seperti SEC di AS.
12. PENGUNGKAPAN PERSYARATAN 1. Data Perusahaan Keuangan (secara triwulanan di AS) 2. Breakdown Struktur Modal 3. informasi latar belakang Substansial Corporation pada setiap calon untuk dewan direksi (termasuk nama, hubungan pekerjaan dengan perusahaan dan kepemilikan saham di korporasi ) 4. Kompensasi agregat yang dibayarkan kepada semua pejabat eksekutif (mgmt atas) sebagai wel sebagai data kompensasi individu untuk setiap dari lima pejabat eksekutif dengan bayaran tertinggi, yang diberi nama.; 5. Semua pemegang saham memegang lebih dari 5% dari korporasi modal saham 6. Informasi tentang merger yang diusulkan dan restrukturisasi 7. Usulan amendemen anggaran dasar 8. Dan nama-nama individu dan / atau perusahaan yang diusulkan sebagai auditor. Persyaratan pengungkapan di Inggris dan negara-negara lain yang mengikuti model Anglo-US ae serupa. Namun, mereka umumnya memerlukan pelaporan semi-tahunan dan data yang kurang di sebagian besar kategori, termasuk statistik keuangan dan informasi yang diberikan pada calon.
13. AKSI KORPORASI MEMBUTUHKAN PEMEGANG SAHAM PERSETUJUAN 2 aksi korporasi rutin yang membutuhkan persetujuan pemegang saham dalam model Anglo-uS adalah: 1. Pemilihan Direksi 2. Pengangkatan aksi korporasi Auditor Non-rutin yang juga memerlukan persetujuan pemegang saham meliputi: 1. Pendirian atau perubahan saham Pilihan plac (karena rencana ini mempengaruhi kompensasi eksekutif dan papan) 2. merger dan pengambilalihan 3. Restrukturisasi 4. Perubahan dari anggaran dasar
14. INTERAKSI ANTARA PEMAIN • The Anglo-US model yang membentuk kompleks, sistem yang diatur untuk komunikasi dan interaksi antara pemegang saham dan perusahaan. Berbagai peraturan organisasi dan independen memainkan peran penting dalam tata kelola perusahaan. • Pemegang Saham dapat menggunakan hak pilihnya tanpa menghadiri rapat umum tahunan orang • Semua pemegang saham yang tercatat menerima berikut melalui surat (agenda untuk pertemuan termasuk informasi latar belakang pada semua proposal "proxy pernyataan", laporan tahunan korporasi dan kartu suara. • Pemegang Saham dapat memilih dengan proksi
15. Dalam model Anglo-Amerika, berbagai investor institusi dan ahli keuangan memantau kinerja perusahaan dan tata kelola perusahaan meliputi:. 1. Berbagai dana investasi khusus 2. dana Venture-modal, atau dana yang berinvestasi di baru atau start-up perusahaan 3. Lembaga Pemeringkat 4. Auditor 5. Dana yang menargetkan investasi di perusahaan bangkrut atau masalah. Sebaliknya, Satu Bank melayani banyak fungsi-fungsi ini dalam model Jepang dan Jerman. Akibatnya , salah satu elemen penting dari kedua model ini adalah hubungan yang kuat antara perusahaan dan bank yang utama.
16. MODEL JEPANG Model Jepang ditandai dengan tingkat tinggi kepemilikan saham oleh bank afiliasi dan perusahaan ● sistem perbankan yang ditandai dengan kuat, link jangka panjang antara bank dan korporasi ● A hukum, kebijakan publik dan kerangka kebijakan industri yang dirancang untuk mendukung dan mempromosikan "keiretsu" ● BOD terdiri dari semata-mata dalam dan relatif rendah (di beberapa corp., ada non) tingkat masukan dari luar pemegang saham ● Ekuitas Pembiayaan penting bagi Jepang Korporasi ● Insiders dan afiliasi mereka adalah pemegang saham utama di sebagian besar perusahaan-perusahaan Jepang.
17. PEMAIN KUNCI Sistem Jepang Corporate Governance adalah banyak sisi, berpusat di sekitar bank utama dan jaringan keuangan / industri atau keiretsu ● Bank memberikan klien perusahaan dengan pinjaman serta layanan yang terkait dengan obligasi, masalah ekuitas, rekening pemukiman dan jasa konsultasi terkait. ● Bank utama umumnya merupakan pemegang saham utama di perusahaan. ● Di AS, Anti-monopoli melarang satu bank dari menyediakan ragam ini layanan ● Banyak perusahaan Jepang juga memiliki hubungan keuangan yang kuat dengan jaringan perusahaan afiliasi. Jaringan ini, ditandai dengan crossholding dari utang dan ekuitas, perdagangan barang dan jasa, dan kontak bisnis informal dikenal sebagai keiretsu ● Pemerintah diarahkan kebijakan industri memainkan peran kunci dalam Pemerintahan Jepang, ini termasuk perwakilan resmi dan tidak resmi di papan perusahaan , ketika sebuah perusahaan menghadapi kesulitan keuangan
18. Dalam model Jepang, empat pemain kunci adalah: 1. Main Bank (pemegang saham dalam utama) 2. Perusahaan afiliasi atau keiretsu (pemegang saham dalam utama) 3. Manajemen dan Interaksi 4. Pemerintah antara pemain ini berfungsi untuk menghubungkan hubungan lebih menyeimbangkan kekuasaan, seperti dalam kasus Anglo-US Model - pemegang saham non-afiliasi memiliki sedikit atau tidak ada suara di Pemerintahan Jepang -Sebagai Akibatnya, ada beberapa direksi benar-benar independen (mewakili pemegang saham luar)
19. Kepemilikan Saham Pola Di Jepang, Lembaga keuangan dan perusahaan memegang teguh kepemilikan pasar ekuitas. Perusahaan asuransi Bank 43% Korporasi 25% asing 3%
20. Susunan dewan direksi manajer Executive - kepala divisi utama perusahaan dan badan administratif pusat. PRAKTEK UMUM: • Jika keuntungan perusahaan jatuh selama jangka, bank utama dan anggota keiretsu dapat menghapus direksi dan menunjuk calon mereka sendiri untuk dewan perusahaan. • Pengangkatan pensiun birokrat pemerintah untuk papan perusahaan • rata-rata papan japanese berisi 50 anggota
21. Perusahaan Austria mengatur Beberapa elemen juga berlaku Belanda Jerman Korporasi ScandinaviaFrance Belgia
22. UNSUR UNIK dari MODEL GERMAN Struktur Dua-tier Dewan Yang berarti terdiri dari pengurus dan dewan pengawas. 2 papan benar-benar berbeda; tidak ada yang dapat melayani secara bersamaan pada papan manajemen perusahaan. Ukuran dewan pengawas Hal ini diatur oleh hukum tidak dapat diubah oleh pemegang saham Voting pembatasan hak Voting pembatasan hak legal; ini membatasi pemegang saham untuk memberikan suara persentase tertentu dari jumlah modal saham korporasi, terlepas dari kepemilikan saham posisi
23. BOARD KOMPOSISI Dua-tier Manajemen Dewan Dewan "Vorstand" Dewan Pengawas "Aufsichtsrat" Karyawan / buruh Union & Pemegang Saham Bertanggung jawab untuk manajemen harian dari perusahaan Bertanggung jawab untuk menunjuk dewan manajemen Bertanggung jawab untuk menunjuk anggota untuk dewan pengawas
24. PEMAIN KUNCI BANK Perusahaan pemegang saham Bank biasanya memainkan peran multi sebagai pemegang saham, kreditur, penerbit baik ekuitas dan utang, penyimpanan. Perusahaan Jerman dan Austria menggunakan singkatan AG berikut nama-nama mereka
25. Kepemilikan Saham Pola Korporasi Bank 41% 27% Dana Pensiun Perorangan