Structural Principles The structural principles assume that corporate  translation - Structural Principles The structural principles assume that corporate  Indonesian how to say

Structural Principles The structura

Structural Principles The structural principles assume that corporate governance mechanisms matter for the performance of the firm and the achievement of the firm’s goals. These principles dictate the ideal composition of the board of directors (principles 2.1 and 2.2) and separation of roles on the board (principle 2.3), for the existence and structure of board committees (principles 2.4, 4.2, 4.3 and 9.2) and the operation of annual general meetings (encouraging effective participation — principle 6.1, and the use of auditors — principle 6.2). The review in the previous section showed that structure alone does not necessarily lead to better governance although it influences the context of decision making. So the effectiveness of the structural principles will depend on how they influence behaviour. Further, the empirical evidence supporting the structural principles is mixed. The underlying assumption that governance structures matter for firm performance has been dismissed by most financial economists (for example, Bhagat and Black, 1998; Demsetz and Villonga, 2001). The weight of empirical evidence shows that board structure (such as a majority of independent non-executive directors) and/or that separation of board roles (such as between the chair and CEO positions) is unrelated to better average financial performance, other things being equal. There is, however, evidence that the operation of boards improves around important events (such as poor performance, CEO dismissal) and on certain key decisions-making issues (such as CEO remuneration, auditor appointment) when the board has a majority of independent non-executive directors. The number of non-executive directors in Australia are positively associated with the likelihood of CEO dismissal and negatively associated with excess CEO remuneration (Suchard, Singh, and Barr, 2001; Fleming and Stellios, 2002). Thus, we cannot expect to observe better financial outcomes for equity and debt holders as a result of adopting the principles on structure. Behavioural change is also necessary.
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Structural Principles <br>The structural principles assume that corporate governance mechanisms matter for <br>the performance of the firm and the achievement of the firm’s goals. These <br>principles dictate the ideal composition of the board of directors (principles 2.1 <br>and 2.2) and separation of roles on the board (principle 2.3), for the existence and <br>structure of board committees (principles 2.4, 4.2, 4.3 and 9.2) and the operation <br>of annual general meetings (encouraging effective participation — principle 6.1, <br>and the use of auditors — principle 6.2). <br>The review in the previous section showed that structure alone does not <br>necessarily lead to better governance although it influences the context of decision <br>making. So the effectiveness of the structural principles will depend on how they <br>influence behaviour. Further, the empirical evidence supporting the structural <br>principles is mixed. The underlying assumption that governance structures matter <br>for firm performance has been dismissed by most financial economists (for <br>example, Bhagat and Black, 1998; Demsetz and Villonga, 2001). The weight of <br>empirical evidence shows that board structure (such as a majority of independent <br>non-executive directors) and/or that separation of board roles (such as between the <br>chair and CEO positions) is unrelated to better average financial performance, <br>other things being equal. There is, however, evidence that the operation of boards <br>meningkatkan sekitar peristiwa penting (seperti kinerja yang buruk, CEO pemecatan) dan <br>keputusan pengambilan kunci tertentu masalah (seperti CEO remunerasi, auditor <br>janji) ketika dewan memiliki mayoritas non-eksekutif independen <br>direksi. Jumlah direktur non-eksekutif di Australia positif <br>terkait dengan kemungkinan CEO pemecatan dan terkait negatif dengan <br>kelebihan CEO remunerasi (Suchard, Singh, dan Barr, 2001; Fleming dan Stellios, <br>2002). Dengan demikian, kita tidak bisa berharap untuk mengamati hasil keuangan yang lebih baik untuk ekuitas dan <br>pemegang utang sebagai akibat dari mengadopsi prinsip-prinsip pada struktur. Perilaku <br>perubahan juga diperlukan.
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Prinsip struktural <br>Prinsip struktural mengasumsikan bahwa mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan <br>kinerja firma tersebut dan pencapaian tujuan perusahaan. Ini <br>menentukan susunan ideal Dewan Direksi (prinsip 2,1 dan <br>dan 2,2) dan pemisahan peran di papan tulis (prinsip 2,3), untuk keberadaan dan <br>struktur Dewan Direksi (prinsip 2,4, 4,2, 4,3 dan 9,2) dan operasi <br>pertemuan umum tahunan (mendorong partisipasi efektif — prinsip 6,1, <br>dan penggunaan auditor — prinsip 6,2). <br>Tinjauan di bagian sebelumnya menunjukkan bahwa struktur saja tidak <br>harus mengarah pada tata kelola yang lebih baik meskipun itu mempengaruhi konteks <br>Membuat. Jadi, efektivitas prinsip struktural akan tergantung pada bagaimana mereka <br>mempengaruhi perilaku. Selanjutnya, bukti empiris yang mendukung struktur struktural <br>prinsip dicampur. Asumsi yang mendasari bahwa struktur tata kelola penting <br>untuk kinerja perusahaan telah diberhentikan oleh sebagian besar ekonom keuangan (untuk <br>contoh, Bhagat dan Black, 1998; Demsetz dan Villonga, 2001). Berat <br>bukti empiris menunjukkan bahwa struktur Dewan (seperti mayoritas independen <br>Direktur non-Eksekutif) dan/atau pemisahan peran Dewan (seperti antara <br>kursi dan posisi CEO) tidak terkait dengan kinerja keuangan yang lebih rata, <br>hal lain yang sama. Namun, ada bukti bahwa pengoperasian papan <br>meningkatkan sekitar peristiwa penting (seperti kinerja yang buruk, pemecatan CEO) dan <br>pengambilan keputusan kunci tertentu (seperti remunerasi CEO, auditor dan <br>pengangkatan) bila Dewan memiliki mayoritas independen non-Eksekutif <br>Direktur. Jumlah Direktur non-eksekutif di Australia secara positif <br>terkait dengan kemungkinan pemberhentian CEO dan negatif terkait dengan <br>kelebihan remunerasi CEO (Suchard, Singh, dan Barr, 2001; Fleming dan Stellios, <br>2002). dengan demikian, kita tidak dapat mengharapkan untuk mengamati hasil keuangan yang lebih baik <br>pemegang hutang sebagai akibat dari mengadopsi prinsip pada struktur. Perilaku <br>perubahan juga diperlukan.
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