While I am not concerned at this po

While I am not concerned at this point with defending Bradley's views, a glance at the type of argument which might be urged against him by a modern logician will help us to appreciate his thesis. If the modern logician were to call his argument anything but nonsense, he would probably say the criterion was an analytic statement. C. I. Lewis, for example, would not say that the statement was purely conventional, but he would claim that as a mere analysis of meaning it could impose no limit on the actual. "No relation of meanings as such can impose any restriction upon any actual or thinkable world or any empirical state of affairs." (3). Analytic truth is determinative only of the manner in which we may consistently think about whatever experience might possibly present. "Analytic truth and empirical truth can have no effect on each other." (1). The relation of thought and reality is an extremely difficult question, and no consideration can be given to it here (2). What I want to emphasize is that Lewis' view is based on something which Bradley rejects. Analytic judgements, as Kant tells us, are thought through identity. But this is just the kind of thinking that Bradley insists doesn't mean anything. The principle by which thought works is never bare abstract identity, but always identity in difference. Thought is always a synthetic unity (3).
Bradley of course may be wrong. But on the other hand, Lewis adheres to naive realism - at least as a method of exposition - and his logic is built up on this basis. It is, to say the least, a highly uestionable procedure to apply such a logic to the work of a man who denies its very basis.

Results (French) 1:

While I am not concerned at this point with defending Bradley's views, a glance at the type of argument which might be urged against him by a modern logician will help us to appreciate his thesis. If the modern logician were to call his argument anything but nonsense, he would probably say the criterion was an analytic statement. C. I. Lewis, for example, would not say that the statement was purely conventional, but he would claim that as a mere analysis of meaning it could impose no limit on the actual. "No relation of meanings as such can impose any restriction upon any actual or thinkable world or any empirical state of affairs." (3). Analytic truth is determinative only of the manner in which we may consistently think about whatever experience might possibly present. "Analytic truth and empirical truth can have no effect on each other." (1). The relation of thought and reality is an extremely difficult question, and no consideration can be given to it here (2). What I want to emphasize is that Lewis' view is based on something which Bradley rejects. Analytic judgements, as Kant tells us, are thought through identity. But this is just the kind of thinking that Bradley insists doesn't mean anything. The principle by which thought works is never bare abstract identity, but always identity in difference. Thought is always a synthetic unity (3). Bradley peut bien sûr se tromper. Mais en revanche, Lewis adhère au réalisme naïf - au moins comme une méthode d'exposition - et sa logique est construite sur cette base. C'est, à tout le moins, une procédure très uestionable d'appliquer cette logique aux travaux d'un homme qui refuse son fondement même.

Results (French) 2:

Bien que je ne suis pas concerné à ce point de défendre le point de vue de Bradley, un regard sur le type d'argument qui pourrait être poussé contre lui par un logicien moderne va nous aider à apprécier sa thèse. Si le logicien moderne devait appeler son argument tout sauf un non-sens, il dirait probablement le critère était une déclaration analytique. CI Lewis, par exemple, ne dirais pas que la déclaration était purement conventionnelle, mais il serait prétendre que comme une simple analyse de ce qui signifie qu'il pourrait imposer aucune limite sur le réel. "Aucune relation de significations en tant que tel ne peut imposer aucune restriction d'aucun monde réel ou pensable ou de tout État empirique des affaires." (3). La vérité analytique est déterminant que de la manière dont nous pouvons toujours penser à ce que l'expérience pourrait éventuellement présents. «Vérité analytique et vérité empirique peuvent avoir aucun effet sur ​​l'autre." (1). Le rapport de la pensée et de la réalité est une question extrêmement difficile, et aucune considération peut être donnée à ici (2). Ce que je veux souligner est que le point de vue de Lewis est basée sur quelque chose qui rejette Bradley. Jugements analytiques, que Kant nous dit, sont considérés par l'identité. Mais ceci est exactement le genre de réflexion que Bradley insiste ne veut rien dire. Le principe selon lequel pensait œuvres est jamais nue identité abstraite, mais toujours l'identité dans la différence. La pensée est toujours une unité synthétique (3).
Bradley bien sûr peut être erroné. Mais d'autre part, Lewis adhère à réalisme naïf - au moins comme une méthode d'exposition - et sa logique est construit sur ​​cette base. Il est, pour dire le moins, une procédure très uestionable d'appliquer une telle logique à l'œuvre d'un homme qui nie sa base même.