Initial theoretical studies
support the promise of PES to be more cost efficient than
indirect approaches to conservation (Ferraro & Simpson,
2005). However, theory needs to be informed through
learning-by-doing in real world contexts.
PES interventions in developing countries face particular
challenges arising from a high incidence of poverty, variable
or insecure rights to land, and heavy reliance on collection
of natural resources for subsistence. In addition, many
areas believed to provide high levels of ecosystem service
provision are often state-owned, with communities having
only customary rights of access, or being strictly excluded,
as in the case of many National Park systems. PES projects
do not in general pay individuals for obeying the law
(Sommerville et al., 2010b) yet such payments may enable
poorer communities to engage in strategies that reduce their
reliance on resource collection from protected areas (Bruner
et al., 2001) and more fairly distribute the burden of costs
arising from expanded protected area networks. Whilst
there has been a recent proliferation of research on PES
there remains a gap in empirical evaluations that assess the ability of contingent payments to address conservation and
development objectives simultaneously.