The section known as "the way of tr

The section known as "the way of truth" discusses that which is real and contrasts with the argument in the section called "the way of opinion," which discusses that which is illusory. Under the "way of truth," Parmenides stated that there are two ways of inquiry: that it is, on the one side, and that it is not.[14] on the other side. He said that the latter argument is never feasible because there is no thing that can not be:

For never shall this prevail, that things that are not are. (B 7.1)
There are extremely delicate issues here. In the original Greek the two ways are simply named "that Is" (ὅπως ἐστίν) and "that Not-Is" (ὡς οὐκ ἐστίν) (B 2.3 and 2.5) without the "it" inserted in our English translation. In ancient Greek, which, like many languages in the world, does not always require the presence of a subject for a verb, "is" functions as a grammatically complete sentence. Much debate has been focused on where and what the subject is. The simplest explanation as to why there is no subject here is that Parmenides wishes to express the simple, bare fact of existence in his mystical experience without the ordinary distinctions, just as the Latin "pluit" and the Greek huei (ὕει "rains") mean "it rains"; there is no subject for these impersonal verbs because they express the simple fact of raining without specifying what is doing the raining. This is, for instance, Hermann Fränkel's thesis.[15] Many scholars still reject this explanation and have produced more complex metaphysical explanations. Since existence is an immediately intuited fact, non-existence is the wrong path because a thing cannot disappear, just as something cannot originate from nothing. In such mystical experience (unio mystica), however, the distinction between subject and object disappears along with the distinctions between objects, in addition to the fact that if nothing cannot be, it cannot be the object of thought either:

Thinking and the thought that it is are the same; for you will not find thinking apart from what is, in relation to which it is uttered. (B 8.34–36)
For to be aware and to be are the same. (B 3)
It is necessary to speak and to think what is; for being is, but nothing is not. (B 6.1–2)
Helplessness guides the wandering thought in their breasts; they are carried along deaf and blind alike, dazed, beasts without judgment, convinced that to be and not to be are the same and not the same, and that the road of all things is a backward-turning one. (B 6.5–9)
Thus, he concluded that "Is" could not have "come into being" because "nothing comes from nothing". Existence is necessarily eternal. That which truly is [x], has always been [x], and was never becoming [x]; that which is becoming [x] was never nothing (Not-[x]), but will never actually be. Parmenides was not struggling to formulate the laws of conservation of mass and conservation of energy; he was struggling with the metaphysics of change, which is still a relevant philosophical topic today.

Moreover he argued that movement was impossible because it requires moving into "the void", and Parmenides identified "the void" with nothing, and therefore (by definition) it does not exist. That which does exist is The Parmenidean One, which is timeless, uniform, and unchanging:

How could what is perish? How could it have come to be? For if it came into being, it is not; nor is it if ever it is going to be. Thus coming into being is extinguished, and destruction unknown. (B 8.20–22)
Nor was [it] once, nor will [it] be, since [it] is, now, all together, / One, continuous; for what coming-to-be of it will you seek? / In what way, whence, did [it] grow? Neither from what-is-not shall I allow / You to say or think; for it is not to be said or thought / That [it] is not. And what need could have impelled it to grow / Later or sooner, if it began from nothing? Thus [it] must either be completely or not at all. (B 8.5–11)
[What exists] is now, all at once, one and continuous... Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike; nor is there any more or less of it in one place which might prevent it from holding together, but all is full of what is. (B 8.5–6, 8.22–24)
And it is all one to me / Where I am to begin; for I shall return there again. (B 5)
Perception vs. Logos[edit]
Parmenides claimed that there is no truth in the opinions of the mortals. Genesis-and-destruction, as Parmenides emphasizes, is a false opinion, because to be means to be completely, once and for all. What exists can in no way not exist.

For this view, that That Which Is Not exists, can never predominate. You must debar your thought from this way of search, nor let ordinary experience in its variety force you along this way, (namely, that of allowing) the eye, sightless as it is, and the ear, full of sound, and the tongue, to rule; but (you must) judge by means of the Reason (Logos) the much-contested proof which is expounded by me.

Results (English) 1:

The section known as "the way of truth" discusses that which is real and contrasts with the argument in the section called "the way of opinion," which discusses that which is illusory. Under the "way of truth," Parmenides stated that there are two ways of inquiry: that it is, on the one side, and that it is not. [14] on the other side. He said that the latter argument is never feasible because there is no thing that can not be:For never shall this prevail, that things that are not are. (Bb 7.1)There are extremely delicate issues here. In the original Greek the two ways are simply named "that Is" (ὅπως ἐστίν) and "that Not-Is" (ὡς οὐκ ἐστίν) (B 2.3 and 2.5) without the "it" inserted in our English translation. In ancient Greek, which, like many languages in the world, does not always require the presence of a subject for a verb, "is" functions as a grammatically complete sentence. Much debate has been focused on where and what the subject is. The simplest explanation as to why there is no subject here is that Parmenides wishes to express the simple, bare fact of existence in his mystical experience without the ordinary distinctions, just as the Latin "pluit" and the Greek huei (ὕει "rains") mean "it rains"; there is no subject for these impersonal verbs because they express the simple fact of raining without specifying what is doing the raining. This is, for instance, Hermann Fränkel's thesis. [15] Many scholars still reject this explanation and have produced more complex metaphysical explanations. Since existence is an immediately intuited fact, non-existence is the wrong path because a thing cannot disappear, just as something cannot originate from nothing. In such mystical experience (unio mystica), however, the distinction between subject and object disappears along with the distinctions between objects, in addition to the fact that if nothing cannot be, it cannot be the object of thought either:Thinking and the thought that it is are the same; for you will not find thinking apart from what is, in relation to which it is uttered. (Bb 8.34–36)For to be aware and to be are the same. (B 3)It is necessary to speak and to think what is; for being is, but nothing is not. (Bb 6.1–2)Helplessness guides the wandering thought in their breasts; they are carried along deaf and blind alike, dazed, beasts without judgment, convinced that to be and not to be are the same and not the same, and that the road of all things is a backward-turning one. (Bb 6.5–9)Thus, he concluded that "Is" could not have "come into being" because "nothing comes from nothing". Existence is necessarily eternal. That which truly is [x], has always been [x], and was never becoming [x]; that which is becoming [x] was never nothing (Not-[x]), but will never actually be. Parmenides was not struggling to formulate the laws of conservation of mass and conservation of energy; he was struggling with the metaphysics of change, which is still a relevant philosophical topic today.Moreover he argued that movement was impossible because it requires moving into "the void", and Parmenides identified "the void" with nothing, and therefore (by definition) it does not exist. That which does exist is The Parmenidean One, which is timeless, uniform, and unchanging:How could what is perish? How could it have come to be? For if it came into being, it is not; nor is it if ever it is going to be. Thus coming into being is extinguished, and destruction unknown. (Bb 8.20–22)Nor was [it] once, nor will [it] be, since [it] is, now, all together,/One, continuous; for what coming-to-be of it will you seek? /In what way, whence, did [it] grow? Neither from what-is-not shall I allow/You to say or think; for it is not to be said or thought/That [it] is not. And what need could have impelled it to grow/Later or sooner, if it began from nothing? Thus [it] must either be completely or not at all. (Bb 8.5–11)[What exists] is now, all at once, one and continuous... Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike; nor is there any more or less of it in one place which might prevent it from holding together, but all is full of what is. (Bb 8.5–6, 8.22–24)And it is all one to me/Where I am to begin; for I shall return there again. (B 5)Perception vs. Logos [edit]Parmenides claimed that there is no truth in the opinions of the mortals. Genesis-and-destruction, as Parmenides emphasizes, is a false opinion, because to be means to be completely, once and for all. What exists can in no way not exist.For this view, that That Which Is Not exists, can never predominate. You must debar your thought from this way of search, nor let ordinary experience in its variety force you along this way, (namely, that of allowing) the eye, sightless as it is, and the ear, full of sound, and the tongue, to rule; but (you must) judge by means of the Reason (Logos) the much-contested proof which is expounded by me.

Results (English) 3:

这段被称为“真理”的讨论，这是真实的，在一段名为“意见之路的参数对比，“对，是虚幻的。“真理的方式下，“他说，有两种探究方式：那是，一方面，和它不是。[ 14 ]在另一边。他说，后者的说法是因为没有东西能不能永远是可行的：

为永远下去，那东西是不是。（7.1）
有极其微妙的问题。在古希腊的两个方法是简单的“是”（ὅπωςἐστίν）和“不”（ὡςοὐκἐστίν）（B 2.3和2。5）没有“它”插在我们的英文翻译。在古希腊，这，像世界上许多语言，不总是需要一个动词存在的问题，“是”作为一个语法的完整的句子。争论一直集中在哪里，什么是主题。最简单的解释为什么没有主体是巴门尼德的意愿表达简单，存在不普通的区别在他的神秘体验赤裸的事实，“普洛依”正如拉丁和希腊辉（ὕει“下雨”）的意思是“下雨”；是没有受到这些客观的动词，因为它们表达了没有指定什么是做下简单的事实。这是，例如，赫尔曼神父änkel的论文。[ 15 ]许多学者仍然拒绝接受这样的解释，产生了更为复杂的形而上学的解释。由于存在一个立即直觉的事实，非存在是错误的路径，因为一件事不能消失，就像一些不能来源于什么。在这种神秘的经验（unio mystica），然而，主体和客体之间的区别消失随着对象之间的区别，除了事实，如果没有什么不可，它不能是思维的对象：

思维和思想，它是相同的；你不会找到思考除了是什么关系，它说。（B 8.34–36）
要注意和被是相同的。（3）
必须说话和思考是什么；是，但没有什么是不。（B 6.1–2）
无奈引导他们摇摆不定的思想；他们携带的聋子和瞎子一样，茫然，野兽没有判断，相信是不是一样的，不一样的，这一切的路是一个落后的转折之一。（B 6.5–
9）因此，他得出结论，“是”不可能“诞生”因为“没有来自什么”。存在必然是永恒的。那真的是【x】，一直[x]，从未成为【x】；那渐渐[x]从来没有（非[X]），但绝不是。他是不是在努力制定质量守恒和能量守恒定律；他挣扎着变化的形而上学，这仍然是一个有关哲学的话题。

此外他认为运动是不可能的因为它需要进入“无效”，与巴门尼德的“虚空”不确定，因此（根据定义）它不存在。这是一个确实存在的巴门尼德，这是永恒的，统一的，不变的是什么

怎么能灭亡呢？它怎么可能会？如果它应运而生，它不是；它也不是如果要。从而产生熄灭，破坏未知。（B 8。20–22）
也[它]一次，也不会是[它]，因为[它]是的，现在，都在一起，一，连续；什么来将你寻找？/以什么方式，从哪里来，没有[它]的成长吗？无论从什么是不是我让你说的或想；它不是要说或想，[它]不是。什么需要促使它成长或迟或早，如果它开始于什么？因此，[它]必须完全或根本不。（B 8.5–11）
[存在]现在，突然，一个连续的…不可分的，因为它是相似的；也没有任何更多或更少的在一个地方，可以防止它牵在了一起，但都是满有。（8.5–B 6，8.22–
24），这是一个对我/我在哪里开始；因为我将回到那里去。（5）
感知与理性[编辑]
巴门尼德声称没有真理的人的意见。发生破坏，如巴门尼德强调，是一种错误的观点，因为是意味着要完全，一劳永逸。什么存在不能不存在。

对于这一观点，认为这是不存在的，不占主导地位。你必须排除你的思想从这样的搜索，也让普通经验的变化迫使你沿着这条路走下去，（即，让眼睛失明），因为它是，和耳朵，充满了声音，和舌头，统治；但（你必须）的原因是法官（逻各斯）最有争议的证据，阐述了由我。