People in the wildland fire community will be familiar with the Yarnel translation - People in the wildland fire community will be familiar with the Yarnel English how to say

People in the wildland fire communi



People in the wildland fire community will be familiar with the Yarnell Hill Fire of 2013. This fire occurred in 2013 and led to the death of 19 firefighters, all members of the Granite Mountain Hotshots team. Only one member of the team survived. Apart from this tragedy a number of homes were lost to the fire and homeowners sued the Arizona State Forestry Division (ASFD) claiming that the Division ‘negligently failed to protect them from harm that resulted from the Fire’.

I’ve made the comment before that in Australia we think everyone sues in America, and what’s more, every plaintiff wins. I’ve previously drawn attention to cases where plaintiffs have not been successful (see US city not liable for failure to rescue (February 13, 2013) and What if you rang 911 and no-one came? (March 10, 2015)) and that is the result, so far, in this case.

On 28 April, Judge Gama of the Superior Court Of Arizona, Maricopa County dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on grounds that will be familiar to Australian lawyers and readers of this blog. (You can read His Honours reasons for judgment here).

The first issue was whether it was possible to sue the Arizona State Forestry Division. Judge Gama found that it was not, that is the Forestry Division was a ‘nonjural entity’. The Judge agreed with that submission holding that ‘a governmental entity may sue or be sued “only if the legislature has so provided”’ (p 2). As the legislature had not ‘so provided’ the Forestry Division could not be sued. That is not as dramatic as it sounds and the position is the same in Australia (though we may not use the term ‘jural’ or ‘nonjural entity’). Some legislation will say that a government authority is an entity capable of being sued in its own name; others do not. Where it does not then the appropriate defendant is the state and we’ve seen that with, for example, litigation from the Canberra fires where the defendant was the State of NSW, not the NSW Rural Fire Service. The finding that the ASFD could not be sued was not really the issue; that just directed focus on whether or not the State of Arizona, rather than the Forestry Division was negligent.

Judge Gama found that there had been no negligence. His ruling was based on the law of negligence and given the common legal history of England, the US and Australia the law is not very different. As His Honour said (at p 2):

To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove (1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach of that standard of care by the defendant; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury; and (4) actual damages.

The critical issue was whether the state, when fighting the fire, owed a legal duty to take care to protect the homeowners. As has been noted on this blog, the English courts and the Australian courts have all ruled that a fire service that is established to act in the public good does not owe a duty of care to individuals even those at direct risk from the fire (see Capital and Counties v Hampshire Council [1997] QB 2004; Warragamba Winery v NSW [2012] NSWSC 701; Electro Optics and West v NSW [2012] ACTSC 184; Myer Stores v State Fire Commissioner (Tasmania) [2012] TASSC 54; Hamcor Pty Ltd v State of Qld [2014] QSC 224 and Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra [2009] HCA 15 (with respect to police).)

No duty of care

Judge Gama, quoting the Restatement (2d) of Torts § 323 (1965), said that a duty could arise if the defendant, Arizona, had voluntarily undertaken to protect the plaintiffs. Where a defendant agrees to render services to another, intended to protect that other from harm, there can be liability if the defendant increases the risk of harm or the injured person has relied upon the defendant to protect them.

In this case the state of Arizona, when it commenced fighting the fire on state land it was acting to protect its own land, not as a service to the homeowners that might have been, and were, affected if and when the fire escaped their control efforts.

His Honour also found that the homeowners did not rely on the state to protect them. According to Judge Gama (p 4) the ‘Plaintiffs urge that they could have taken “special emergency measures” (e.g., trimming vegetation, hosing down buildings and vehicles)’ but they did not. They did not claim that they relied on the state to do those tasks for them, but they relied on the state to effectively fight the fire. His Honour dismissed this claim saying ‘Clearly, remedial fire prevention acts are not alternatives for the act undertaken by the State’. In essence it was not open, or reasonable, for the plaintiffs to say ‘we didn’t have to do anything to protect ourselves when we could have taken simple measures, because we expected the fire service to stop the fire before it got here’. I suspect that aspect of the ruling would be encouraging for those actively encouraging home owners in Australia to develop their own fire plan and develop their own resilience.

The plaintiffs also alleged negligence because they relied upon the State to give notice to evacuate. This case failed as they could not point to any ‘undertaking’ by the state to deliver an evacuation warning nor could they point to any law that would impose a legal duty upon the state to do so.

His Honour did not address whether or not any action by the defendant increased the risk to the plaintiffs so one has to infer that the plaintiffs made no allegation to that effect.

Public policy

The plaintiffs’ argued that as a matter of public policy the court should find that there was a duty owed to those in the path of the fire. Judge Gama thought ‘public policy’ went the other way. He said (p 5, reference omitted):

The Court is persuaded that public policy does not support imposition of a duty on the State to protect Plaintiffs’ property from wildfires … “The decisions of how to properly fight a particular fire, how to rescue victims in a fire, or what and how much equipment to send to a fire, are discretionary judgmental decisions which are inherent in this public safety function of fire protection.”

And being ‘discretionary judgmental decisions’ for the executive arm of government, they are not subject to review or second-guessing by the judicial arm.

‘Abnormally dangerous doctrine’

The plaintiffs relied on this doctrine. As an Australian lawyer I’m not quite sure what this is but I would infer that it’s like the old rule described here as ‘the rule in Rylands v Fletcher’ (referring to Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330). That rule imposed strict liability (that is liability without proof of negligence) if a defendant brought something dangerous onto his or her land and it escaped. I would infer that the ‘abnormally dangerous doctrine’ says that if you are engaged in some abnormally dangerous activity you are liable for any harm caused, regardless of the care taken to avoid that harm. Following the decision in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones (1994) 179 CLR 520, which said that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is no longer law in Australia, that doctrine probably does not apply here, if it ever did.

Regardless of the doctrine’s application in Australia, Judge Gama ruled it had no application in this case as the defendant was not engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity. The state was engaged in the activity of firefighting and it was the fire that caused the damage to the plaintiffs so even if firefighting is an abnormally dangerous activity, it is not what caused the plaintiffs’ losses and the doctrine could have no application.

Conclusion

The conclusion was that the home owners’ claims were dismissed. The plaintiffs have filed an appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals so the matter is not yet over. Given the interest that the wildfire community has in this fire and its legal consequences, this is a case that will be watched with interest.
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People in the wildland fire community will be familiar with the Yarnell Hill Fire of 2013. This fire occurred in 2013 and led to the death of 19 firefighters, all members of the Granite Mountain Hotshots team. Only one member of the team survived. Apart from this tragedy a number of homes were lost to the fire and homeowners sued the Arizona State Forestry Division (ASFD) claiming that the Division ‘negligently failed to protect them from harm that resulted from the Fire’.I’ve made the comment before that in Australia we think everyone sues in America, and what’s more, every plaintiff wins. I’ve previously drawn attention to cases where plaintiffs have not been successful (see US city not liable for failure to rescue (February 13, 2013) and What if you rang 911 and no-one came? (March 10, 2015)) and that is the result, so far, in this case.On 28 April, Judge Gama of the Superior Court Of Arizona, Maricopa County dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on grounds that will be familiar to Australian lawyers and readers of this blog. (You can read His Honours reasons for judgment here).The first issue was whether it was possible to sue the Arizona State Forestry Division. Judge Gama found that it was not, that is the Forestry Division was a ‘nonjural entity’. The Judge agreed with that submission holding that ‘a governmental entity may sue or be sued “only if the legislature has so provided”’ (p 2). As the legislature had not ‘so provided’ the Forestry Division could not be sued. That is not as dramatic as it sounds and the position is the same in Australia (though we may not use the term ‘jural’ or ‘nonjural entity’). Some legislation will say that a government authority is an entity capable of being sued in its own name; others do not. Where it does not then the appropriate defendant is the state and we’ve seen that with, for example, litigation from the Canberra fires where the defendant was the State of NSW, not the NSW Rural Fire Service. The finding that the ASFD could not be sued was not really the issue; that just directed focus on whether or not the State of Arizona, rather than the Forestry Division was negligent.Judge Gama found that there had been no negligence. His ruling was based on the law of negligence and given the common legal history of England, the US and Australia the law is not very different. As His Honour said (at p 2): To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove (1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach of that standard of care by the defendant; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury; and (4) actual damages.The critical issue was whether the state, when fighting the fire, owed a legal duty to take care to protect the homeowners. As has been noted on this blog, the English courts and the Australian courts have all ruled that a fire service that is established to act in the public good does not owe a duty of care to individuals even those at direct risk from the fire (see Capital and Counties v Hampshire Council [1997] QB 2004; Warragamba Winery v NSW [2012] NSWSC 701; Electro Optics and West v NSW [2012] ACTSC 184; Myer Stores v State Fire Commissioner (Tasmania) [2012] TASSC 54; Hamcor Pty Ltd v State of Qld [2014] QSC 224 and Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra [2009] HCA 15 (with respect to police).)No duty of careJudge Gama, quoting the Restatement (2d) of Torts § 323 (1965), said that a duty could arise if the defendant, Arizona, had voluntarily undertaken to protect the plaintiffs. Where a defendant agrees to render services to another, intended to protect that other from harm, there can be liability if the defendant increases the risk of harm or the injured person has relied upon the defendant to protect them.In this case the state of Arizona, when it commenced fighting the fire on state land it was acting to protect its own land, not as a service to the homeowners that might have been, and were, affected if and when the fire escaped their control efforts.His Honour also found that the homeowners did not rely on the state to protect them. According to Judge Gama (p 4) the ‘Plaintiffs urge that they could have taken “special emergency measures” (e.g., trimming vegetation, hosing down buildings and vehicles)’ but they did not. They did not claim that they relied on the state to do those tasks for them, but they relied on the state to effectively fight the fire. His Honour dismissed this claim saying ‘Clearly, remedial fire prevention acts are not alternatives for the act undertaken by the State’. In essence it was not open, or reasonable, for the plaintiffs to say ‘we didn’t have to do anything to protect ourselves when we could have taken simple measures, because we expected the fire service to stop the fire before it got here’. I suspect that aspect of the ruling would be encouraging for those actively encouraging home owners in Australia to develop their own fire plan and develop their own resilience.The plaintiffs also alleged negligence because they relied upon the State to give notice to evacuate. This case failed as they could not point to any ‘undertaking’ by the state to deliver an evacuation warning nor could they point to any law that would impose a legal duty upon the state to do so.His Honour did not address whether or not any action by the defendant increased the risk to the plaintiffs so one has to infer that the plaintiffs made no allegation to that effect.Public policyThe plaintiffs’ argued that as a matter of public policy the court should find that there was a duty owed to those in the path of the fire. Judge Gama thought ‘public policy’ went the other way. He said (p 5, reference omitted): The Court is persuaded that public policy does not support imposition of a duty on the State to protect Plaintiffs’ property from wildfires … “The decisions of how to properly fight a particular fire, how to rescue victims in a fire, or what and how much equipment to send to a fire, are discretionary judgmental decisions which are inherent in this public safety function of fire protection.”And being ‘discretionary judgmental decisions’ for the executive arm of government, they are not subject to review or second-guessing by the judicial arm.‘Abnormally dangerous doctrine’The plaintiffs relied on this doctrine. As an Australian lawyer I’m not quite sure what this is but I would infer that it’s like the old rule described here as ‘the rule in Rylands v Fletcher’ (referring to Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330). That rule imposed strict liability (that is liability without proof of negligence) if a defendant brought something dangerous onto his or her land and it escaped. I would infer that the ‘abnormally dangerous doctrine’ says that if you are engaged in some abnormally dangerous activity you are liable for any harm caused, regardless of the care taken to avoid that harm. Following the decision in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones (1994) 179 CLR 520, which said that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is no longer law in Australia, that doctrine probably does not apply here, if it ever did.Regardless of the doctrine’s application in Australia, Judge Gama ruled it had no application in this case as the defendant was not engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity. The state was engaged in the activity of firefighting and it was the fire that caused the damage to the plaintiffs so even if firefighting is an abnormally dangerous activity, it is not what caused the plaintiffs’ losses and the doctrine could have no application.ConclusionThe conclusion was that the home owners’ claims were dismissed. The plaintiffs have filed an appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals so the matter is not yet over. Given the interest that the wildfire community has in this fire and its legal consequences, this is a case that will be watched with interest.
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在野火社区

人熟悉2013亚内尔山火。这场火灾发生在2013和LED的19名消防队员死亡,该花岗岩山地能人团队所有成员。只有一个成员的团队存活。除了这个悲剧的许多房子都被丢到火和房主起诉亚利桑那州林业部门(ASFD)声称师过失未能保护他们免受伤害,造成火灾。

我之前的评论,在澳大利亚我们认为每个人都在美国起诉,什么的更多的,每一个原告胜诉。我以前提请注意的情况下,原告并没有成功(见我们的城市不承担失败的救援(2013年2月13日),如果你打911,没有人来?(2015年3月10日)),结果,到目前为止,在这种情况下。

28四月,亚利桑那州的高级法院法官γ,马里科帕县驳回原告的诉讼请求的理由,将本博客的澳大利亚律师和读者所熟悉。(你可以读到他在这里的荣誉的理由),第一个问题是是否有可能起诉亚利桑那州林业局。法官伽马发现不是,那是林业部门是一个“nonjural实体。法官同意这一意见,认为“一个政府机构可以起诉或被起诉”,只有立法机关才提供“”(2)。由于立法机关没有“如此规定”,林业部门不能起诉。这不是戏剧性的声音和地位在澳大利亚一样(虽然我们可能不会使用“法律”或“nonjural实体)。有些立法会说,一个政府机关是一个能够以自己的名义被起诉的实体。如果它不那么合适的被告是国家,我们已经看到,例如,从堪培拉大火被告是新南威尔士州的诉讼,不是新州乡村消防服务。发现ASFD不能起诉不是问题;只是针对是否亚利桑那州,而不是林业部门的过失。

法官伽马发现没有过失。他的裁决是基于疏忽的法律,并给出了英国的共同法律史,美国和澳大利亚的法律是不是很不同。正如他的名誉所说(在2):建立一个要求的疏忽,原告必须证明(1)的责任,要求被告符合一定的护理标准;(2)违反了被告的行为和伤害;(4)实际损害赔偿标准的违反,欠下一个法律责任来照顾保护房主。已经在这个博客上指出,英国法院和澳大利亚法院的判决都是消防服务,是建立在公共利益的行为不应该有责任照顾的人即使在直接的危险从火中(见资本、县五汉普郡议会[ 1997 ] QB 2004;沃勒甘巴酒厂V新南威尔士州[ 2012 ] nswsc 701;光电、西五新南威尔士州[ 2012 ] actsc 184;Myer商店V州消防专员(塔斯马尼亚)[ 2012 ] tassc 54;hamcor有限公司诉国家昆士兰[ 2014 ] QSC 224和斯图尔特V科克兰德该[ 2009 ] HCA 15(相对于警察)。)

没有注意义务

法官γ,引用重述(2D)的侵权行为§323(1965),说,如果被告,亚利桑那州,自愿承担,以保护原告的责任可能出现。被告同意将服务提供给另一方,意在保护对方不受伤害,如果被告增加伤害的危险或受伤的人的风险,则可以承担责任,当它开始在国有土地上的火,它是为了保护自己的土地,而不是作为一个服务的房主可能已经,并受到影响,如果和当火灾逃离他们的控制努力。他荣幸地也发现,房主没有依靠国家来保护他们。根据判断γ(P 4)“原告认为他们可以采取“紧急措施”(例如,修剪植物,冲洗下来的建筑物和车辆)”,但他们没有。他们并没有声称他们依赖于国家为他们做这些任务,但他们依赖于国家有效地打击火灾。他的荣誉驳回了这一说法'清楚,预防火灾的行为不是国家所采取的行动的替代品。从本质上讲,这是不公开的,或合理的,对原告说,“我们没有做任何事情来保护自己,当我们可以采取简单的措施,因为我们预计消防服务,以阻止火灾之前,它得到了”。我怀疑这方面的裁决将是令人鼓舞的那些积极鼓励澳大利亚的业主在发展自己的防火计划和发展自己的能力。这种情况未能如他们不能指出的任何“承诺”的国家提供一个疏散警告,也不能指出任何法律,将强加一个法律责任的国家,这样做。他的荣誉并没有解决是否采取任何行动,被告增加了风险的原告,所以必须推断,原告没有提出任何指控的效果。原告认为,作为一个公共政策的问题,法院应该发现有一个责任,欠那些在火灾的道路。法官认为,“公共政策”伽马到其他的方式。他说(5,参考省略):法院认为公共政策不支持征收的税国家保护原告的财产从野火……”决定如何正确对抗特定的火灾,如何在火灾中抢救灾民,或什么设备发送一个火,是自由裁量判断的决定是这个公共安全功能的消防
固有的。”对于政府行政部门的
和裁量判断的决定”,他们不受审查或猜测被司法的手臂。

'abnormally危险原则”

原告依赖这一学说。作为澳大利亚的律师,我不是很确定这是什么,但我会推断,这就像老规则描述为“在赖兰v弗莱彻规则”(指赖兰V弗莱彻(1868)LR 3 HL 330)。如果被告在他或她的土地上带来了一些危险的话,那条规定强制规定了严格责任(即无过失责任)。我会推断,“反常危险学说”说,如果你从事一些异常危险的活动,你有责任为任何伤害造成的,不管采取的照顾,以避免伤害。继在伯尼港务局V琼斯将军决定(1994)179 CLR 520,其中说,在赖兰诉弗莱彻的规则不再是法律在澳大利亚,这个原则可能并不适用于这里,如果它曾经。

不顾原则的应用在澳大利亚,法官裁定有γ不适用于这个情况作为被告不从事异常危险活动。国家从事消防活动是造成损害原告即使消防是一个异常危险活动的火,它不是导致原告的损失和原则可能不适用。

结论

认为业主索赔被驳回。原告向亚利桑那州上诉法院提出上诉,因此这件事尚未结束。鉴于野火社区在这场火灾中的兴趣和它的法律后果,这是一个案例,将被观看的兴趣。
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