Interconnectedness of the CAPS proj

Interconnectedness of the CAPS project and the Benefits
Payment Card project
At the time the Benefits Payment Card contract was signed, the proposed CAPS
timetable specified that, by December 1996, 50% of all post offices would have been
converted and half of all CAPS benefit payments would be transacted using the new
Benefits Payment Card. Both systems would continue to roll out in parallel over the
following two years. The CAPS development project was managed by the DSS and
was comparable in size and complexity to the Benefits Payment Card development. All
three of the bidders shortlisted for the Benefits Payment Card project told the NAO
that they were conscious of the size and complexity of CAPS and that any slippage in
its development would be likely to affect the Benefits Payment Card project.
The NAO view was that the risks of late delivery of CAPS were not well managed
prior to the replan of the whole CAPS and Benefits Payment Card programme in
February 1997. A new project director took up post in mid-1996, around the time
that the Benefits Payment Card contract was awarded to Pathway. He found that the
project had not been appropriately resourced. The DSS also commissioned a review by
consultants Ernst & Young. In December 1996 they reported
ž a lack of project management expertise at the right level within the CAPS senior
management team;
ž a focus on short-term objectives to support the initial go-live, at the expense of
developing a set of plans and designs for the programme as a whole; and
ž doubts over the strength of financial projections and cost control.
Ernst & Young made recommendations for improved management and planning which
the DSS implemented to reduce the risk of subsequent slippage on CAPS. Although
CAPS had contributed to delays in the project up to the replan in February 1997,
the DSS thereafter successfully released software and data from CAPS in time for the
equivalent releases of Payment Card software by Pathway. NAO found no evidence
that, from then onwards, the releases of CAPS software had delayed the implementation
of the Benefits Payment Card.
Implications of cancellation of the Benefits Payment Card
project for the various parties
The cancellation of the project had implications for benefit claimants who would not
be able to gain from the service improvements and other advantages stated for the
payment card, such as quicker response to changes in their entitlement. ICL wrote off
project development costs of £180 million in June 1999, while the project received
much negative publicity in the national, business and specialist press at the time.
DSS’s positive business case for the project reduced from £667 million net present
value to £148 million, due mainly to the delay in achieving estimated fraud savings.
The DSS also lost its planned savings in the cost of administering order books, but
these were broadly matched by savings in lower than expected payments to Pathway
for processing card transactions. Some £127 million of the £270 million costs of their
CAPS program was attributed to features required to link to the Benefits Payment Card.
However, by subsequently introducing an electronic system for the control of order
books, the DSS still hoped to eliminate 85% of fraudulent misuse of order books. By
moving over to payment by bank transfer between 2003 and 2005, the DSS also sought
to make administrative savings earlier than if the Payment Card project had continued.
With the abandonment of the Benefits Payment Card project, Post Office Counters Ltd
had to manage the project to automate its offices on its own. Under standard accounting
practice, the Post Office cannot take account of income that may be generated in the
future but cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, in November 1999, Post Office Counters
Ltd was obliged to record in its accounts an exceptional charge of £571 million ‘for
acquiring an asset which does not at this stage yield sufficient income to justify the cost’.
Of greater potential significance, the decision to move to bank transfer as a method
of paying benefits left Post Office Counters Ltd and its sub-postmasters exposed to
the risks of loss of benefit payment business and the associated indirect advantage of
payees’ other business.
Conclusion
There were many features of this project that increased the likelihood that it would
not be completely successful. The complexity of the task was not fully appreciated
originally, and the attempts to combine the different interests of the two purchasers
and the supplier could have proved to be problematic. The NAO view was that
the project had a high probability of failure as soon as the contract was signed,
though this was not fully evident at the time. The pressures this caused during
the implementation stage would have severely tested any project organization

Results (English) 1:

Interconnectedness of the CAPS project and the BenefitsPayment Card projectAt the time the Benefits Payment Card contract was signed, the proposed CAPStimetable specified that, by December 1996, 50% of all post offices would have beenconverted and half of all CAPS benefit payments would be transacted using the newBenefits Payment Card. Both systems would continue to roll out in parallel over thefollowing two years. The CAPS development project was managed by the DSS andwas comparable in size and complexity to the Benefits Payment Card development. Allthree of the bidders shortlisted for the Benefits Payment Card project told the NAOthat they were conscious of the size and complexity of CAPS and that any slippage inits development would be likely to affect the Benefits Payment Card project.The NAO view was that the risks of late delivery of CAPS were not well managedprior to the replan of the whole CAPS and Benefits Payment Card programme inFebruary 1997. A new project director took up post in mid-1996, around the timethat the Benefits Payment Card contract was awarded to Pathway. He found that theproject had not been appropriately resourced. The DSS also commissioned a review byconsultants Ernst & Young. In December 1996 they reportedž a lack of project management expertise at the right level within the CAPS seniormanagement team;ž a focus on short-term objectives to support the initial go-live, at the expense ofdeveloping a set of plans and designs for the programme as a whole; andž doubts over the strength of financial projections and cost control.Ernst & Young made recommendations for improved management and planning whichthe DSS implemented to reduce the risk of subsequent slippage on CAPS. AlthoughCAPS had contributed to delays in the project up to the replan in February 1997,the DSS thereafter successfully released software and data from CAPS in time for theequivalent releases of Payment Card software by Pathway. NAO found no evidencethat, from then onwards, the releases of CAPS software had delayed the implementationof the Benefits Payment Card.Implications of cancellation of the Benefits Payment Cardproject for the various partiesThe cancellation of the project had implications for benefit claimants who would notbe able to gain from the service improvements and other advantages stated for thepayment card, such as quicker response to changes in their entitlement. ICL wrote offproject development costs of £180 million in June 1999, while the project receivedmuch negative publicity in the national, business and specialist press at the time.Dss's positive business case for the project reduced from £667 million net presentvalue to £148 million, due mainly to the delay in achieving estimated fraud savings.The DSS also lost its planned savings in the cost of administering order books, butthese were broadly matched by savings in lower than expected payments to Pathwayfor processing card transactions. Some £127 million of the £270 million costs of theirCAPS program was attributed to features required to link to the Benefits Payment Card.However, by subsequently introducing an electronic system for the control of orderbooks, the DSS still hoped to eliminate 85% of fraudulent misuse of order books. Bymoving over to payment by bank transfer between 2003 and 2005, the DS also soughtto make administrative savings earlier than if the Payment Card project had continued.With the abandonment of the Benefits Payment Card project, Post Office Counters Ltdhad to manage the project to automate its offices on its own. Under standard accountingpractice, the Post Office cannot take account of income that may be generated in thefuture but cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, in November 1999, Post Office CountersLtd was obliged to record in its accounts an exceptional charge of £571 million ' foracquiring an asset which does not at this stage yield sufficient income to justify the cost '.Of greater potential significance, the decision to move to bank transfer as a methodof paying benefits left Post Office Counters Ltd and its sub-postmasters exposed tothe risks of loss of benefit payment business and the associated indirect advantage ofpayees ' other business.ConclusionThere were many features of this project that increased the likelihood that it wouldnot be completely successful. The complexity of the task was not fully appreciatedoriginally, and the attempts to combine the different interests of the two purchasersand the supplier could have proved to be problematic. The NAO view was thatthe project had a high probability of failure as soon as the contract was signed,though this was not fully evident at the time. The pressures this caused duringthe implementation stage would have severely tested any project organization

Results (English) 3:

盖的项目相互联系和利益
支付卡项目在时间的好处
卡支付合同签订，该帽
时间表规定，由十二月的1996，所有邮局50%将已转换的瓶盖
给付的一半将作为交易使用新
效益支付卡。系统将继续推出并联在
两年。限制发展项目是由DSS和
管理的大小和复杂性的福利支付卡的发展。三所有的投标人入围
福利支付卡项目告诉NAO
，他们意识到了规模和复杂性，任何延误
帽它的发展将可能影响福利支付卡项目。
NAO的看法是，风险上限延迟交付没有管理好的整体
帽和待遇支付卡计划在二月1997之前具有
。一个新的项目经理接手后在1996年中，在时间，效益
支付卡合同授予通路。他发现
项目没有适当的资源。DSS还委托审查
&年轻顾问厄恩斯特。1996十二月他们报道
ž缺乏项目管理的专业知识在合适的水平，在高级管理团队帽

ž；注重短期目标来支持最初的去生活，在
开发一套方案的规划和设计作为一个整体的费用；
ž和疑虑的财务预测和成本控制的强度。厄恩斯特年轻为
&改进管理和规划决策支持系统实现
减少帽后续滑移风险的建议。虽然
帽产生了项目计划在二月到1997延迟，
此后成功释放的途径从支付卡软件
等效发布时间上限的软件和数据的决策支持系统。没有证据表明，NAO
，从那时起，CAPS软件发布推迟的好处支付卡实施
。
的福利支付卡
项目对各方的影响
该项目取消了福利者谁不
可以从改善服务等优势对于
支付卡增益的影响，如更快的反应在他们的福利变化。ICL写信
在1999六月180000000£项目的开发成本，同时该项目获得全国很多负面宣传
，当时的商业和专业出版社。
对项目从667000000净现值£
减少£148000000 DSS的商业案例实证，主要由于在实现估计欺诈储蓄延迟。
DSS也失去了其计划的储蓄管理订单的成本，但这些大致相匹配的储蓄
在低于预期的支付途径
处理卡交易。他们的计划270000000成本£
盖一些£127000000是由于需要链接到待遇支付卡的特点。但随后引入
，秩序
书籍的电子控制系统，DSS仍然希望消除欺诈滥用订单85%。通过
移动超过2003和2005之间的银行转账付款，DSS也寻求
作出行政储蓄比如果支付卡项目继续前。
收益中支付卡项目的放弃，邮局柜台公司
必须管理项目的自动化办公室自己。
下标准会计实践，邮局不考虑收入，可能在未来产生但不能保证
。因此，在十一月1999，邮局柜台
公司不得不记录在账户异常电荷£571000000为获取资产
不在这个阶段产生足够的收入来调整成本的更大的潜在意义
，决定作为一种给付离开公司和邮局柜台的给付
业务亏损风险和相关的间接利用收款人的其他业务
暴露其子邮政局长方法
搬到银行转移。结论

有许多特点，这个项目会不会增加
完全成功的可能性。任务的复杂性没有充分认识
最初，并试图结合两
购买者不同利益和供应商可能被证明是有问题的。审计署认为
项目具有很高的失败率一旦签订合同，尽管这不是完全明显
时。这导致在
压力执行阶段会受到严重考验任何项目组织