Self-policing as a problem
In addition to non-existent/poor oversight, the preferred method of self-policing is highly concerning for a topic as serious as lab safety.
More than 100 labs experimenting with potential bioterror agents have been cited by regulators at the CDC and USDA for serious safety and security failings since 2003. In several instances, troubled labs and even federal regulators appeared to misrepresent the significance of the government’s enforcement efforts, according to the USA Today.
This shouldn’t be surprising. The conflict of interest should be evident to everyone, including Congress.
As a way of providing some oversight, Congress requires a report each year on the number of thefts, losses and releases of bioterror pathogens at labs regulated by the Federal Select Agent Program.
Yet, according to USA Today, regulators provide scant details of their activities and the problems identified at labs. Usually just three pages long plus a cover page, the reports contain only aggregated counts of lab incidents by type, plus vague information on a few serious incidents.
The example provided in the report is a scary one. The select agent program told Congress it had "imposed a $425,000 civil money penalty" on an unnamed lab where a serious biosafety lapse in 2008 had resulted in a cow in a nearby disease-free herd becoming infected with Brucella bacteria, which cause brucellosis.
However, USA Today’s investigation revealed that the penalty was never actually imposed, and the USDA never corrected it with Congress. USA Today has identified the lab as a part of Louisiana State University’s AgCenter.
Inadequate policing by the CDC and USDA of a program they fund is not the only fault with this common method.
For all labs, not just those in the select agent program, biosafety committees are assembled to assess the risks of certain research projects. The problem with these committees is that they often comprise a scientist’s colleagues, whether it be the principle investigator (PI) or a mentor the researcher has worked closely with in the past. While it may not be intentional, the closeness of the committee to the research leaves a wide open path for bias. Even if there is no bias, the proximity still leaves itself open to questions.
And still, there are those researchers who chose to just ignore biosafety rules.
Documents obtained by USA Today include at least 50 incidents since 2012 in which researchers were conducting experiments with genetically manipulated organisms without proper approval from internal safety committees. In some cases, records show researchers flaunting their institutional rules.