Japanese foreign policy toward Sout

Japanese foreign policy toward Southeast Asia, this diverse region, stretching from South Asia to the islands in the South Pacific Ocean, was in part defined by Japan's rapid rise in the 1980s as the dominant economic power in Asia. The decline in East-West and Sino-Soviet tensions during the 1980s suggested that economic rather than military power would determine regional leadership. During the decade, Japan displaced the United States as the largest provider of new business investment and economic aid in the region, although the United States market remained a major source of Asia-Pacific dynamism. Especially following the rise in value of the yen relative to the US dollar in the late-1980s (after the Plaza Accord), Japan's role as a capital and technology exporter and as an increasingly significant importer of Asian manufactured goods made it the core economy of the Asia-Pacific region.

1950sEdit
From the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, Japan's relations with the rest of Asia were concerned mainly with promoting its far-flung, multiplying economic interests in the region through trade, technical assistance, and aid. Its main problems were the economic weakness and political instability of its trading partners and the growing apprehension of Asian leaders over Japan's "overpresence" in their region.

Japan began to normalize relations with its neighbors during the 1950s after a series of intermittent negotiations, which led to the payment of war reparations to Burma (now Myanmar), Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Thailand's reparations claims were not settled until 1963. Japan's reintegration into the Asian scene was also facilitated by its having joined the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific in December 1954 and by its attendance at the April 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. In the late 1950s, Japan made a limited beginning in its aid program. In 1958 it extended the equivalent of US$50 million in credits to India, the first Japanese loan of its kind in post-World War II years. As in subsequent cases involving India, as well as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Taiwan, Pakistan, and South Korea, these credits were rigidly bound to projects that promoted plant and equipment purchases from Japan. In 1960 Japan officially established the Institute of Asian Economic Affairs (renamed the Institute of Developing Economies in 1969) as the principal training center for its specialists in economic diplomacy.

1960sEdit
In the early 1960s, the government adopted a more forward posture in seeking to establish contacts in Asia. In 1960 the Institute of Asian Economic Affairs was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). In 1961 the government established the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund as a new lending agency. The following year the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency made its debut.

By the mid-1960s, Japan's role had become highly visible in Asia as well as elsewhere in the world. In 1964 Japan became a full member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). As economic and trade expansion burgeoned, leaders began to question the propriety and wisdom of what they variously described as "mere economism," an "export-first policy," and the "commercial motives of aid." They wanted to contribute more to the solution of the North-South problem, as they dubbed the issue—the tenuous relationship between the developed countries and the developing countries.

1970sEdit
Efforts since the beginning of the 1970s to assume a leading role in promoting peace and stability in Asia, especially Southeast Asia, by providing economic aid and by offering to serve as a mediator in disputes, faced two constraints. Externally, there was fear in parts of Asia that Japan's systematic economic penetration into the region would eventually lead to something akin to its pre-World War II scheme to exploit Asian markets and materials. Internally, foreign policymakers were apprehensive that Japan's political involvement in the area in whatever capacity would almost certainly precipitate an anti-Japanese backlash and adversely affect its economic position.

After a reassessment of policy, the Japanese leadership appeared to have decided that more emphasis ought to be given to helping the developing countries of the region modernize their industrial bases to increase their self-reliance and economic resilience. In the late 1970s, Japan seemed to have decided that bilateral aid in the form of yen credits, tariff reductions, larger quota incentives for manufactured exports, and investments in processing industries, energy, agriculture, and education would be the focus of its aid programs in Asia.

1990sEdit
By 1990 Japan's interaction with the vast majority of Asia-Pacific countries, especially its burgeoning economic exchanges, was multifaceted and increasingly important to the recipient countries. The developing countries of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand; Singapore was treated as a newly industrialized economy, or NIE) regarded Japan as critical to their development. Japan's aid to the ASEAN countries totaled US$1.9 billion in Japanese fiscal year (FY) 1988 versus about US$333 million for the United States during United States FY 1988. Japan was the number one foreign investor in the ASEAN countries, with cumulative investment as of March 1989 of about US$14.5 billion, more than twice that of the United States. Japan's share of total foreign investment in ASEAN countries in the same period ranged from 70 to 80 percent in Thailand to 20 percent in Indonesia.

In the early 1990s, the Japanese government was making a concerted effort to enhance its diplomatic stature, especially in Asia. Toshiki Kaifu's much publicized spring 1991 tour of five Southeast Asian nations—Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines—culminated in a May 3 major foreign policy address in Singapore, in which he called for a new partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and pledged that Japan would go beyond the purely economic sphere to seek an "appropriate role in the political sphere as a nation of peace." As evidence of this new role, Japan took an active part in promoting negotiations to resolve the Cambodian conflict.

Results (English) 2:

日本对南洋的外交政策，不同的区域，从南亚到南太平洋岛屿，在日本的迅速崛起，在20世纪80年代在亚洲占据主导地位的经济大国定义部分。在西方，中苏关系紧张在20世纪80年代提出，经济而不是军事力量将决定区域领导的下降。在这十年中，日本取代美国在该地区的新的商业投资和经济援助的最大提供者，尽管美国市场保持活力的亚太地区的一个主要来源。尤其是在上升的日元对美元的相对价值在上世纪80年代末（广场协议后），日本作为一个资本和技术出口国和制成品的进口国亚洲越来越重要了亚太地区的核心经济。

1950sedit
从50年代中期到60年代末，日本与其他亚洲国家的关系主要关注促进它遥远，乘以该地区经济利益是通过贸易，技术援助，与援助。它的主要问题是其贸易伙伴的经济衰退和政治不稳定和亚洲领导人越来越担心日本的“作用过”在他们的区域。

日本开始规范与邻国的关系在20世纪50年代后的一系列间歇性的谈判，其中LED的战争赔款的支付（现在缅甸的缅甸），印度尼西亚，菲律宾，和越南共和国（越南南部）。泰国的赔偿要求不解决，直到1963。日本重返亚洲场景也以其有利于加入科伦坡计划在亚洲和太平洋地区在十二月1954和由其参加合作经济和社会发展在1955四月亚非会议在万隆，印度尼西亚。在20世纪50年代末，日本在其援助计划有限的开始。1958它扩展的50000000美元相当于印度的学分，在二战后首次日本贷款。在随后的案件，印度，以及斯里兰卡，马来西亚，台湾，巴基斯坦，韩国，这些积分被严格地绑定到项目，促进植物和设备的采购来自日本。在1960日正式成立的亚洲经济事务研究所（1969改名为发展中国家的经济研究所）作为主要的经济外交专家的培训中心。

1960sedit
在20世纪60年代早期，政府在寻求建立联系，在亚洲采取了一种更向前的姿势。1960亚洲经济事务研究所放的国际贸易和工业部（MITI）管辖。政府于1961成立了海外经济合作基金作为一种新的贷款机构。次年海外技术合作机构首次亮相。

在60年代中期，日本的角色已成为亚洲以及世界其他地方随处可见。1964日本成为经济合作和发展组织（OECD）成员。随着经济的迅速发展和扩大贸易，领导人开始质疑他们被描述为“仅仅是经济主义的正当性和智慧，”“出口第一的政策，“援助”的商业动机。“他们希望南北的问题的解决作出更大的贡献，他们被称为发达国家和发展中国家之间脆弱的关系

1970sedit
问题。努力，20世纪70年代初以来，承担促进亚洲和平与稳定的主导作用，尤其是南洋，提供经济援助和提供作为争论的调停者，面对两个约束。外部的，在日本的系统的经济渗透到该地区最终会导致类似于第二次世界大战前的计划利用亚洲市场和材料的亚洲部分地区有恐惧。内部，外交政策制定者担心在任何的能力方面日本的政治参与几乎肯定会引发反日反弹产生不利影响的经济地位。

重新评估后的政策，日本领导人似乎已经决定，更强调应该给予帮助该地区的发展中国家的工业基地的现代化来提高他们的独立和经济弹性。在20世纪70年代末，日本似乎已经决定，双边援助日元的信用形式，降低关税，配额优惠大制成品出口，在加工工业，能源，农业和教育的投资，将在亚洲的援助计划的重点。

1990sedit
1990日本的互动与绝大多数的亚洲国家，尤其是新兴的经济交流，是多方面的，发展中国家越来越重要。东盟发展国家（文莱，印度尼西亚，马来西亚，菲律宾，泰国；新加坡作为一个新兴工业化经济体，或聂）视日本为其发展的关键。日本的援助东盟国家总计1900000000美元的日本财政年度（FY）1988与美国约333000000美元，在美国1988财政年度。日本是在东盟国家中排名第一的外国投资者，截至3月1989的累积投资约为14500000000美元，超过美国的两倍。日本在同一时期总在东盟国家外资股的范围从70到百分之80在泰国，百分之20在印度尼西亚。

在20世纪90年代早期，日本政府正在努力加强其外交的地位，特别是在亚洲。海部俊树闹得沸沸扬扬的1991春季游览五个东南亚国家马来西亚，文莱，泰国，新加坡，和菲律宾最终在五月三日的主要外交政策在新加坡的地址，其中他呼吁与东南亚国家联盟（东盟）的一个新的伙伴关系和承诺，日本将超越单纯的经济领域寻求政治上的一个“合适的角色，作为一个国家的和平。”这一新的作用的证据，日本积极推动谈判解决柬冲突。